Public financial support to national film production is typically conditional on very subjective artistic and socio-cultural criteria and objectives. Yet the question remains as to whether state subsidies actually help films at the box office. The results of this study suggests that the public grant regime was clearly not able to assure the development of the industry as intended, since in an overwhelming number of cases, production losses exceeded subsidy. Specific institutional and political features characterizing the Italian system are also contended to compound problems.
Introduction
Do state subsidies help films at the box office? The Italian State along with other European countries continues to provide public financial support for their film industries, as well as other traditional industries (Aydin, 2007; Brandt and Svendsen, 2009 ). Bagella and Becchetti (1999: 238) set out five criteria for justifying this expenditure, all conditional on 'works of art' criteria. Their study uses data drawn from the Italian trade journal Gazzetta del Cinema. They investigated the box-office returns for the period 1985 to 1996, during which time they found that once account had been taken of the lower reputations of the talent employed '…subsidized films do not have a significantly lower performance …in terms of total admissions, daily revenues and prescreen daily admissions ' (p. 246) . This finding stands in stark contrast to the findings of this study. For the later period 1995 to 2003 evidence is produced to show that only three of the 135 films in our dataset that received the State subsidy would have covered their production costs in the absence of the subsidy, with a further 14 films having their production costs covered through the subsidy they received, and thus leaving the bulk of films extremely unprofitable.
The measure of performance used by Bagella and Becchetti is end-of-run box-office revenue generated in the Italian market. However, while revenue is an indicator of film popularity, it does not in truth, adequately reflect the resources embodied in film production and hence reflect alternative uses to which those resources could be put. Their argument concerning the subsidy seems to boil down to the counterfactual: had more recognized talent been employed in those subsidized films, their box-office performance would not have been significantly different from those Italian films that were not subsidised. This does not concord with the findings of this study, since we would expect lesser talent to be paid less than major talent, thus lowering the relative costs of production of subsidized films, meaning that the revenues necessary to cover those costs need not be so high. However, we find that the average revenue performance of subsidised films in relation to costs of production was very poor indeed, questioning the efficacy of the Italian film subsidy regime.
It is shown that the effect of film subsidy between 1995 and 2003 was largely to misallocate resources, demonstrated by the simple fact that Italian moviegoers showed very little interest in the resulting films. At the same time the subsidised films seemed to contribute little positively to the prestige of Italian cinema, an avowed intention of the legislation establishing the subsidy regime.
The paper is structured as follows. Some theoretical considerations and key influential work is briefly set out in the next section. This is followed by some background explaining the operation of the subsidy regime in Italy in the years [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] , and subsequent changes made in 2004. The subsequent section explains the dataset and methods used in the paper and raises some data issues.
Section 5 presents the results and is followed by a discussion and some concluding remarks.
Film subsidies: A brief contextual retrospect
Film projects may be awarded direct subsidies ex ante, or on an ongoing basis on completion of various project milestones (as in South Africa), or entirely ex post, to the producer or 'special purpose vehicle' that forms the temporary commercial entity linked to a specific film. They may also gain indirect subsidies awarded by Government to a third party institution (private or quasipublic) as in the UK, that then channel funding by various decision criteria. While there is an extensive literature exploring the determinants of box office revenue and film success (See the surveys of Hadida (2009 ), McKenzie (2012 ), the role of state subsidies in supporting films at the box office is given little attention. An exception is the performance comparison of subsidised and unsubsidised Italian films conducted by Bagella and Becchetti (1999) . They stressed the need to take account of disparities in the fame and reputation of the cast in such box office comparisons, in order to consider subsidised film on an equal basis with unsubsidised film. Arguably, there could also be some implicit understanding that subsidies are simply not intended to help box office but are more instrumentally used merely to help pursue other objectives such as industry development and to help retain the capability of film making in a given country for political reasons. They may even be awarded just to ensure some national entries in particular film festivals. Yet such an ordering of priorities does not seem to be clearly set out in the Italian and other national contexts.
Reasons for inefficiency in the subsidy allocation system can find their roots in the work of Tullock (1965) , Downs (1967) , Niskanen (1975) and many other public policy commentators (Grampp, 1986; Austen-Smith, 1994) . While the stated objective of public fund allocation lies in the social and cultural policies followed by states and administrations and "rent-seeking" (Grampp, 1989) , the increase in discretionary budget to maximise the quantity of services and products offered could be justified only while the deadweight loss is exceeded by the benefits extracted by consumers (Olszewski and Rosenthal, 2004) . Needless to say, such guidance is not usually followed. Instead, following Niskanen (1975) , biases and inefficiency in budget allocation may be explained by two main elements. First, bureaucrats aim to expand budgets to increase their influence, role and their perceived 'sensation' of wealth and authority. Accordingly, budget maximisation is simply a tool rather than goal and thus working to the detriment of the national public debt. Second, a sort of bilateral monopoly is established between politicians and bureaucrats, giving bureaucrats a status similar to a monopoly organization. Further, once the funds are assigned, politicians do not have specific instruments or information flows to assess the way the budget is then assigned to the subisidised products, making the allocation procedure even more contentious (McKay 2011).
The main effect of these concerns is that the intrinsic characteristics of bureaucrats provides a driver towards oversized budgets, irrespective of the specific financial need to pursue the objective to which the funds are actually allocated for (Acemoglu, 2001; Easterly, 2002) . Inefficiency in budget allocation procedures can be viewed as being sustained by a lack of political authority and responsiveness serving as the main causes of the budget allocation distortions (Downs 1967 ) and also by public organizations having a primary aim to expand rather than to specifically follow the objectives for which they are established (Tullock, 1965) . Miller is supportive of this collection of findings, emphasising that allocation inefficiency is strictly related to bureaucratic incompetence and natural inertia. He draws specific attention to the "self-interested choices of political actors" (Miller, 1997 (Miller, : 1195 .
The above body of work has been influential in policy analysis and discussions and could be deemed to have discernibly and positively affected government action in English-speaking countries well before the year 2000 with the implementation of various new reforms aimed at reducing bureaucratic inefficiency arising form budget allocation (Aucoin, 1991) . Arguably, however, the same strength of influence had not yet reached Continental European countries and Italy, in particular. The findings of this study seem to illustrate one high profile policy context over a period of time, in which even an elementary level of public policy thinking did not seem to become manifest and yield even a modicum of concern over the budget allocation process and its attendant level of efficiency and inherent policy biases. its conception together with screenplay satisfied particular cultural criteria, set down in Table 1 .
Film production subsidies in Italy
Approximate location Table 1 here
Once recognized, films of 'national cultural interest' were then referred to the Committee for Cinema Credit, which made decisions upon the loan-worthiness of their producer(s) and the maximum loan to which they were entitled. 4 In financial terms, productions recognized as "films of By contrast, 'nationally produced films' were not submitted for assessment to the Advisory Committee for Cinema. Rather, such films were able to benefit from cut-rate credit facilities up to a value of €3,200,000 (subsequently raised in 2004 to a range between €3.5 and €5 million).
However, unlike films of 'national cultural interest', 'nationally produced films' could not take shelter under the umbrella of the Guarantee Fund, meaning that the State did not underwrite the loan and the producer was required to repay any loan in full. Table 2 outlines the different categories of films presently supported by the Italian State and the extent of support given. Table 2 here
Thus, in this study, the label of subsidy is given to those loans granted to films of 'national cultural interest' and 'first and second works', which did not require repaying, while 'nationally produced films', although able to access cut-rate credit facilities, are formally categorized as non-subsidized films, since State support had to be repaid. Short films are not included in this analysis. Since 'national cultural interest' is a much more subjective requirement than 'national production', dispute arises about the possible biases and unfair procedures behind the assessment given by the Advisory Committee for Cinema.
An overview of annual public aid to the Italian film industry in the period 1995 to 2003 is presented in Table 3 here While 914 Italian films were actually produced over this nine year period, the raw data revealed considerable missing data cell entries rendering the raw data in total unusable for generating robust financial analyses. Primarily this was due to the lack of consistent financial information about the production of every individual film. Such missing data might well have been incidental and in some cases deliberate. It could be considered as potentially 'masking' further problems in the subsidy allocation process and film performances. For some observations the information in the computer files was indeed highly compromised or incomplete. Supplementary hard copy documentation offering useful data on some individual productions was also examined to help address these concerns. Ultimately, the final dataset includes only those film titles whose essential data -costs, box office takings and film producer information -are complete and reliable in financial terms. The truncated dataset thus likely provides a more flattering picture of the subsidy and allocation process than had the full population of data been available.
As such the presented results illuminating the extremely poor performance of subsidized films can actually be considered a rather conservative view of film subsidy efficiency in Italy. The dataset created comprises cost and revenue information for the sample of 566 films, 135 of which were films of 'national cultural interest' and received loans guaranteed by the Guarantee Fund. The data were provided by the Osservatorio di Cinecittà, which serves as the centre for collection, analysis and diffusion of economic, qualitative and personnel information on the Italian film industry.
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Cinecittà obtained the data about box office revenues and production cost from the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro.
A measure of profitability is derived by deducting production costs from box-office revenues, and that the focus of this paper is on the relative performance of subsidized films with the purpose of establishing how effective the State subsidy has been, these limitations are not critical.
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Results
Tables 4 and 5 describe the data and set out the main results. Table 4 presents a profitability analysis of the 135 subsidized films, while Table 5 does this for the 431 non-subsidized films.
-
Approximate location Table 4 here
Approximate location Table 5 here Table 4 it is clear that although public subsidy attenuates the financial exposure taken by producers, the collective failure of the subsidized films at the box-office means that the subsidy fell far short of assuring them positive returns on their investments. For the 135 films of 'national cultural interest', the Italian State contributed over 40 per cent of their production costs. These films generated an average revenue of €442,041 at the box-office, attracting a subsidy twice that of €969,847, while average production costs were over €2,240,000. As indicated earlier, but worth repeating, only three of the 135 films covered their production costs without the subsidy, while another 14 did so as a result of the subsidy.
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The relationship between revenues and subsidy is further examined by simple bivariate OLS regression of revenues on subsidies. The outcome is a statistically significant positive coefficient 8 The Euro has been in force in countries belonging to the Economic and Monetary Union since 1 st January 2002. Accordingly, a large part of the costs and revenues of films included in the initial raw data are expressed in the pre-euro Italian currency unit, the lira. Therefore, all the monetary values of such films have been converted into Euros, according to the fixed exchange rate of 1,936.27 Italian lire for 1 euro. Economic data of some films -straddling the changeover when the euro came into effect -are partially expressed in Italian lire and partially in Euros in the raw data. 9 The three films were: I Cento Passi (2000), Tano Da Morire (1997), Le Affinità Elettive (1996) . value for the dependent variable, but with an R 2 that is less than 0.1, on top of a highly positively skewed residual plot in which a disproportionate number of films earn revenues less than that predicted by the model, counterbalanced by a relatively small number of films that earn substantially more. Thus, there is no discernable relationship between revenues and subsidy. In contrast, a better fitting model is obtained by simply regressing production costs on subsidy, with a highly significant coefficient value for the dependent variable, as well as an R 2 greater than 0.3, and a better behaved distribution of the residual error. Not surprisingly, the size of the subsidy is related to the size of the production budget, although other factors clearly play a part. Table 5 , describes the performance of the 431 non-subsidized films. While on average these films do not generate profits, their performance in the theatrical market is considerably better than the subsidized films generating an average revenue of €1,861, 476, while costing €2.6 million to make -thus non-subsidized production costs were 16 per cent higher, but revenues over four times higher than the set of films that were subsidized.
Discussion
In the light of the results shown in Tables 4 and 5 , it would appear that the State subsidy given to the Italian film industry between 1995-2003 was not an efficient instrument for generating welfare, supporting the view that resources used in the production of films could have been better utilized elsewhere. Had the films of 'national cultural interest' not been subsidized very few of them indeed would have been made, making them, in effect, quasi-commodities. Furthermore, for the bulk of these films the subsidy was not sufficient to cover production costs.
Drawing upon the cultural subsidy literature, Bagella and Becchetti identify five reasons for State patronage: 1) to broaden cultural options -had films of artistic merit not been made, the artistic scope of future filmmaking would be reduced; 2) to redress the commercial imperative, which puts entertainment before cultural enrichment; 3) to foster cultural identity and national prestige; 4) to generate positive externalities for the community and businesses tied in to the film industry; and 5) to compensate the low productivity associated with 'art' films. For these authors, the subsidy can be justified "provided that we refer to those movies that can be considered a form of art" (Bagella and Becchetti, 1999: 238) . Clearly, this is a market failure argument whereby it is contended that if left to itself the market will under-supply films of cultural merit. Certainly, the criteria laid down in Table 1 privilege artistic talent in the form of director, actors, and screenplay writers, with by far the greatest weight (0.7) given to directors ( it is notable that film producers as a category are not included in the criteria).
However, the evidence presented in Tables 4 and 5 The results can be readily rationalized in the context of simple public policy thinking .The evidence furnished in this Italian arts context shows that budget allocation seems to serve more the fulfilment of needs of the bureaucratic bodies rather than the altruistic reasons for which the subsidy awarding panels are ostensibly commissioned. Over the period under study, the influence of the political dominion of Silvio Berlusconi and his extensive power on private and public media over the last 17 years has been strong and pervasive. However, historically, Italian cinema and more generally culture, has been considered to be dominated by left-wing artists (Gundle, 2000) . Accordingly, many opponents to the present system argue that the genesis of the subsidy regime has allowed leftwing governments to sustain a film industry to circulate supportive ideas and messages. Further, it has also been suggested that left-leaning parties would typically highlight considerable budget reductions to the Cinema when right-leaning governments were in office, playing on the need to preserve the "national cultural interest" that such films convey. Some have even argued that "leftwing welfare has sunk the film industry" (Kolker, 2009; Mecucci, 2007) .
70 per cent of the score needed for a film to be recognized as of "national cultural interest" depends on the artistic contribution from the directors of movies -a contribution effectively deriving from a variety of other awards and nominations -so this is a more subjective rather than objective valuation. Accordingly, there is considerable scope and activity for various lobbies to operate behind the decision processes in prize and subsidy awarding. This is similarly often observed in budget allocation within other social sectors at a more generalized level and also in other geographical contexts (Mitra, 1999; Marshall, 2012) .
Some commentators (e.g. Gundle and Parkle 1996) do, however, acknowledge the unavoidability of market failure arguments. In large part this has been linked to the domination of Italian media and cultural industries maintained by Silvio Berlusconi and his commercial interests (Radaelli 2007; Downey and Koenig 2006) . Such fears were exacerbated by his potential to influence these sectors even more profoundly after his entrance into the political arena in 1994 (Hasted, 2008) .
Consequently, for some scholars, the perceived monopoly of liberal left experts in film subsidy panels would be justified so that they could "make a stand" against the ruling political establishment and its closely linked interests in other media outlets, such as the control of the state television network -RAI. This is ultimately overseen by the Prime Minister, making the conflict of interest issue particularly acute in Berlusconi's period of office (Hanretty, 2007) . Inevitably the exercise of such realpolitik may well have rendered less effective the use of film subsidy in the service of, for example, broader national cultural and industrial objectives.
The institutions and conditions sustaining such political meddling seem to be accord with the theses advanced by Niskanen (1975) and other public policy scholars (Coyne and Leeson, 2004) .
Irrespective of political viewpoints, the political and economic context of Italy has seemingly served to exacerbate bureaucratic inefficiency in this and other policy contexts. A higher subsidy budget has essentially offered greater power and sources of comfort to bureaucrats rather than serving the actual pursuit of the 'national cultural interest' -whatever that term actually means in practice. The Italian case seems to be indicative of a strengthening of the bilateral monopoly between bureaucrats and politicians. In large part, this is due to the exiguity of information flows that are available to meaningfully evaluate the actual subsidy processes. The empirical results presented in this study shows that, the objective of contributing to the prestige of Italian cinema through the subsidy allocation system is highly questionable. At the very least, re-thinking the system of budget allocation to the film industry, as currently configured, seems to be warranted.
Concluding remarks
Historically, cinema and audiences have been conjoint concepts -without audiences there would have been no cinema. However, in the case of Italian cinema, the state subsidy between 1994 and 2003 has seemingly had the effect of separating the two. It has supported a system of provision towards which consumers have been highly indifferent. Essentially subsidy served to move against the historical traditions of cinema. Thus, while it might be claimed by some that subsidy was essential to the very existence of the film industry, the results presented herein suggests that the subsidy regime of itself could not assure the development of the industry since production losses exceeded subsidy, even before distribution costs were factored in. The subsidy regime [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] was ineffective and wasteful. An approach in which markets impose a measure of discipline on the support given to the film industry would surely be preferable -i.e.: product markets in which exhibitors screen films that audiences actually want to see, and finance markets in which investors are attracted to products that have a good prospect of generating positive rates of returns. Specific institutional and contextual elements characterizing the Italian system are contended to compound the difficulties in achieving such an outcome. To some limited extent recent reforms of the subsidy regime have begun to address the issues raised in this study, by creating a system in which both the State and producers share the revenue stream generated by subsidised films on the basis of their respective contributions to costs. In so doing it has started to require the case for subsidies to be much more rigorous from a film production business viewpoint 10 but the existential rationale for such subsidies seems to remain politically unquestioned, at least for the time being. Films of national cultural interest 50 3,750,000** 5,000,000* Subsidised co-produced films*** As above
First and second works 90
Short film distinguished by cultural interest**** 100
Notes: * It includes production cost, and production cost of first copy, overhead expenses, distribution cost ** Through a three-year loan. See D.M. 27 September 2004, chapter 1, section 2, paragraph 7, a) and b) *** They refer to: 1) overall industrial cost if the Italian companies' share: = or > 60% of production cost 2) industrial cost of the Italian company if Italian share: < 60% **** Through a three-year loan.
Maximum acceptable cost (values in euros)
As above 40,000 5,000,000* 1,500,000 
